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Abstract 
 
We examine the impact of aggregate director dealings in the UK. We find that, in aggregate, 
directors are contrarians, but their trades are not informative, contrary to previous US evidence. 
We suggest that this discrepancy is related to the regulatory setting in the UK where directors 
KDYHWRUHSRUWWKHLUWUDGHVZLWKLQVL[GD\V$JJUHJDWHGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGLQJLVDIIHFWHGE\WKHPDUNHW
sentiment as they are net purchasers in the bear market and net sellers in the bull market. Since 
GLUHFWRUV¶UHSRUWLQJLVIDVter in the UK, we then analyze the short-run market reaction to director 
trades. We find that the information content of director dealings is limited to the period 
surrounding the announcement dates. We show that market-to-book, company size, stock 
volatility and market volatility have a significant impact on disclosure period returns. In 
addition, we find that the market reaction is significantly weaker after controlling for market-
to-book and size. Finally, we show that directors time their trades in volatile stocks and 
following high market volatility.    
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1 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Insiders are contrarian traders as they buy shares following a price decline and sell after a price 
run up, though the extent to which such trades convey information is mixed. For example, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider trades are not informative in the short run. In 
contrast, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) show that insider trades convey information to the market as 
share prices increase (decrease), subsequently to their buy (sell) trades. Seyhun (1992) 
documents that the aggregate net number of open market purchase and sell trades by corporate 
insiders in their own firms predict up to 60% of the variation in the one-year ahead aggregate 
stock returns. Knewtson et al. (2010) show that demand by aggregate insiders predicts time 
series variation in the value premiums. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that insiders in 
aggregate are contrarian traders but they have better predictive ability than simple contrarian 
strategies. Marin and Oliver (2008) investigate insider trading activity prior to crashes and find 
that insider purchases remain low all year long, but increase only one month prior to the share 
price jump. On the other hand, Fahlenbrach and Stultz (2011) find that bank CEOs do not 
reduce their shareholdings in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis, leading to wealth 
losses in the wake of the crisis.  
However, the literature that investigates the impact of aggregate insider trading on 
market returns focuses on the US and, to the best of our knowledge, no study focuses on the 
UK. We consider the shortcomings and unresolved puzzles in the insider trading literature to 
explore further the information provided by the corporate insiders and relate it to the alternative 
information environment in which they trade. Insiders in the UK are more likely to possess 
superior information because they are limited to executive and non-executive directors. In 
contrast, in the US the definition is much broader as officers, key employees and large 
shareholders are all considered as insiders.  
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In the UK, insiders are prevented from trading before the release of any price-sensitive 
information. For example, insiders are prevented from trading two months before preliminary, 
interim, or final earnings announcements (Hillier and Marshall, 2002). Outside the ban period, 
insiders need permission from the chairman of the board before trading. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
argue that US regulations favor more frequent news disclosure to avoid misuse of any 
significant information, whereas UK law directly prohibits insiders from trading before any 
price-sensitive news announcement. Moreover, in the UK, directors must disclose to their firm 
any transaction carried out personally no later than the fifth business day following their trade.  
Then, the firm must inform the London Stock Exchange and the information is publicly 
disclosed via the Regulatory News Service (RNS). In the US, prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(2002) Act, directors had to report their trades on the 10th of each month following the 
transaction, resulting in a maximum delay of 10 to 42 calendar days, depending on the trading 
date. Therefore, these differences in insider trading regulations and in reporting periods 
between the UK and the US1 can provide additional insights.  
When information is symmetric, directors¶ trades should have no price impact in the 
market, whereas, under high information asymmetries, LQVLGHUV¶ WUDGHV ZLOO KDYH KLJKHU
information content and will cause a larger price impact (Kyle, 1985; Milgrom and Stokey, 
1982). Since higher market volatility leads to higher information asymmetry, volatility should 
have a significant imSDFWRQWKHPDUNHWUHDFWLRQWRGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHV)RULQVWDQFH0DULQDQG
2OLYHUILQGWKDWGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGLQJLVDIIHFWHGE\PDUNHWFUDVKDQG MXPSVLQWHUPVRI
standard deviations. Therefore, we extend the existing literature by assessing whether directors 
are better at timing their trades in the short run following periods of higher volatility in the 
market and in more volatile stocks. 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed discussion on the differences in regulations and reporting periods, please see Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
and for a discussion on trading bans see Hillier and Marshall (2002). 
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It is documented that insiders sell shares following significant stock price increases and 
buy shares following price declines (Seyhun, 1988, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).  
Similarly, Jiang and Zaman (2010) assert that a contrarian strategy implies insider trading as a 
reaction to market returns. We use varying market conditions (bull and bear markets) to test 
the contrarian behavior of directors. If managers use the market platform to act like contrarians, 
their purchases are expected to dominate in bear periods, and their sell trades during bull 
periods. We define as bull markets the periods January 1999 through March 2000 and January 
2004 through December 2007 and as bear markets the period April 2000 through December 
2003. Furthermore, we test whether there is an asymmetric price response of buy and sell trades 
in bull and bear periods. 
The existing evidence shows that insiders try to take advantage of perceived mispricing, 
suggesting market timing (Jenter, 2005; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; and Rozeff and Zaman, 
1998). However, insider trading is not random in value and glamour stocks (Rozeff and Zaman, 
1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Gregory et al., 2013)2. However, this evidence is based on 
long run returns only. Therefore, we test ZKHWKHU WKHGLUHFWRUV¶YLHZGLIIHUV V\VWHPDWLFDOO\
from market valuations and whether they can take advantage of a potential misvaluation in the 
short run where their trades in the UK are reported more timely as opposed to US disclosure 
regulations.  
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we examine the information content 
of aggregate director trading in the UK. Second, we assess whether managers use market 
sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. Third, we HPSOR\GDLO\GDWDRQLQVLGHUV¶WUDGHV
PDGHDYDLODEOHGXHWRWKH8.¶VGLVFORVXUHUHJXODWLRQVWR LQYHVWLJDWHLQVLGHUV¶WLPLQJDELOLW\
                                                 
2
 Though Gregory et al. (2013) analyze value/glamour strategies, their focus is on long run returns. In this paper 
we focus on short run returns.  
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and informativeness, in the short run, while controlling for size, glamour or value status and 
volatility.  
We find that net purchase ratio (NPR) is positive (negative) in a bear (bull) market, 
even after FRQWUROOLQJ IRU LQVLGHUV¶ FRQWUDULDQ EHKDYLRU 2XU ILQGLQJV VXJJHVW WKDW LQVLGHUV
purchase (sell) in the bear (bull) market. Overall, the aggregate director dealings show that 
managers use bull/bear markets as a platform to act like contrarians. The event study results on 
individual directorV¶ trades show that the price response to these trades is not asymmetric in 
bull and bear markets and the short-term abnormal returns are economically and statistically 
significant. In addition, the perceived mispricing, as measured by market-to-book (M/B) ratio, 
VLJQLILFDQWO\ DIIHFWV WKH PDUNHW UHDFWLRQ WR GLUHFWRUV¶ WUDGHV LQ WKH short run. Finally, our 
ILQGLQJVDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHYLHZWKDWGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGLQJEHKDYLRULVGULYHQE\WKHSHUFHLYHG
mispricing of smaller and volatile stocks.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature and sets the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4, the relationship between market return 
and aggregate director dealings is analyzed. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 5HODWHG/LWHUDWXUHDQG+\SRWKHVHV 
 
The existing evidence consistently shows that insiders are contrarian traders. For example, 
insiders are more likely to sell (purchase) shares following periods of significant price increase 
(decrease), consistent with the notion that insiders trade in anticipation of subsequent price 
reversals (Seyhun 1986, 1992). Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that aggregate insider 
purchases increase (decrease) when market returns are lower (higher). Although contrarian 
behavior is well documented in the UK for individual director dealings there are no studies, to 
our knowledge, which consider aggregate director dealings. We set the following hypothesis.  
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 H1: On an aggregate basis, directors buy (sell) shares after a significant decrease (increase) 
in price, with a price reversal following their trade. 
If the contrarian strategy is employed by insiders at the firm-specific level then there 
should be no relation between market returns and insider trading. On the other hand, if informed 
trading is a market wide phenomenon then a relation between aggregate insider trading and 
market return should exist (Jiang and Zaman, 2010). In this case, market returns would predict 
insider trading behavior. Chowdhury et al. (1993) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide 
evidence that aggregate insider trading is driven by contrarian strategies. We test whether the 
director dealings pattern is different across the bull and bear markets, i.e. whether insider 
buying is higher in a bear market and insider selling is higher in a bull market. If insiders use 
a market platform to act like contrarians, we expect them to buy in bear periods, and sell in bull 
periods, to reflect their expectations of price reversals. Therefore, we split our sample period 
into bull (01/1999 through 03/2000 and 01/2004 through 12/2007) and bear (04/2000 through 
12/2003) periods to assess the trading patterns of directors3. 
H2: Market sentiment (bull and bear periods) has QRLPSDFWRQLQVLGHUV¶EX\LQJRUVHOling of 
shares. 
A related question arises whether the market reaction to director dealings differs during 
bull and bear markets. Chiyachantana et al. (2004) consider this question in the context of 
institutional trading. They find that varying market reactions to buy and sell trades depend on 
bull (bear) market conditions. They argue that following a sell order in bullish markets the 
suppliers of liquidity will not push down prices as it is easy to find a buyer. In contrast, in 
bearish markets institutions have to offer discounts to find buyers for their sell orders, which 
results in buys (sells) having a bigger and permanent price impact in bullish (bearish) markets. 
                                                 
3
 Though these bull and bear markets are very well known in financial markets, to avoid any subjectivity, we 
calculate monthly market returns and confirm that market returns remain negative during the bear period and 
market returns remain positive during the bull period.  
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On the other hand, Friederich et al. (2002) assert that an additional reason for contrarian trades 
to be informative, is that in bearish markets there is a high demand for good stocks which 
depresses the price of smaller stocks. Corporate insiders may see this as the time to buy stocks 
DWEDUJDLQSULFHV LI WKH\KDYHµLQVLGH¶ LQIRUPDWion about the stocks.  To our knowledge, no 
study considers this impact in the case of director dealings. Therefore, we set up the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: Market sentiment (bull and bear periods) have no impact on the market reaction to 
LQVLGHUV¶EX\LQJor selling shares.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that insider transactions are not random across growth 
and value stocks. Insider buying increases as stocks change from growth to value categories. 
Insiders buy heavily in value stocks and sell glamour stocks (Jenter, 2005; Lakonishok and 
Lee, 2001). Gregory et al. (2013) report that when directors buy (sell) value (glamour) stocks 
earn positive (negative) returns which persist for XSWRWZR\HDUVDIWHUWKHGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHV
They also report that abnormal returns are particularly concentrated in smaller value stocks. 
All of the aforementioned studies examine the value-glamour strategy in the long run. 
Recognizing the fact that value-glamour strategies are more relevant in the long run, it would 
be useful to examine the market reaction to director dealings in the short run in the UK where 
trades are reported to be relatively quicker.  
H4a: When insiders purchase shares, the short-term market reaction is higher (lower) for value 
(glamour) stocks. 
H4b: When insiders sell shares, the short-term market reaction is higher (less negative) for 
value stocks. 
Jenter (2005) finds little evidence that managers use inside information in their trades. 
The excess returns after controlling for size and book-to-market (B/M) effects are not different 
from zero. However, these results do not suggest that managers never use valid inside 
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information when making private and corporate decisions. The author argues that the results 
are consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who document that director dealings do not 
predict subsequent returns, once size and B/M effects are controlled for. There is some 
predictability of excess returns in the case of equity purchases in small firms, but no 
predictability of excess returns is found for the sell trades. On the other hand, recent research 
using UK data shows that insider buy and sell trades trigger an immediate market reaction of 
1.16% and -0.26% respectively (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). We test whether insider trades in the 
UK convey information after controlling for M/B and size effects.  
H5: After controlling for size and M/B the short-term excess returns of director trades are not 
different from zero. 
Insiders possess superior information about the firm and information asymmetry is the 
focal point to insider trading (Aboody and Lev, 2000). In a market with a higher level of 
information asymmetry, insider trades will have a higher price impact (see, for instance, Kyle, 
1985; Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Hence, asymmetric information should be positively related 
to the variance of returns. Marin and Oliver (2008) define market crash and jumps in terms of 
standard deviations, and find a relationship with director dealings. We hypothesize that 
volatility is positively related to the market reaction to insider trades.  
H6a. DirectorV¶ purchases (sells) trigger a higher (lower) market reaction for high volatility 
stocks. 
H6b. DirectorV¶ purchases (sells) trigger a higher (lower) market reaction following high 
market volatility. 
 
3 'DWD 
This paper uses Directors Deals, a comprehensive GDWDEDVHRIDOO8.ILUPV¶GLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHV, 
from January 1999 to 'HFHPEHU7KHGDWDEDVHLQFOXGHVQHZVLWHPVRQGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHV
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disclosed by all UK firms to the Regulatory News Service (RNS). We exclude a number of 
observations that are not likely to be driven by private information, such as exercise of options 
or derivatives, script dividends, bonus shares, rights issues, and awards made to directors under 
incentive plans or reinvestment plaQV$OVRDOOGLUHFWRUV¶WUDQVDFWLRQVLQLQYHVWPHQWFRPSDQLHV
DUHH[FOXGHG$IWHUWKLVVFUHHQLQJZHREWDLQGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHVIURPWKH8.PDUNHW:H
check the data for errors and exclude 2,952 (8%) trades as the difference in announcement and 
transaction date is more than five trading GD\V7KHILQDOVDPSOH LQFOXGHVGLUHFWRUV¶
trades in 2,664 listed companies, split into 26,268 (77%) purchases and 7,723 (23%) sell trades. 
This insider-trading database includes transaction price, amount, and value, post-transaction 
holding, change in holding, name and position of the director, and announcement and 
transaction dates, as UK insiders can delay up to five days the announcement of their trade, but 
most report their trades on the RNS on the transaction date (Korczak et al., 2010). 
The sample period covers two sub-periods: the bull periods (January 1999 - March 2000 
and January 2004 - December 2007) and the bear period (April 2000 - December 2003), which 
allows us to test whether insiders time their trades differently under different market conditions. 
Adjusted daily share prices, data on the FTSE All Share Price Index, and firm-specific data are 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters.  
 
4 0DUNHW5HWXUQDQG$JJUHJDWH,QVLGHU7UDGLQJ 
4.1 Impact of pre-event returns on aggregate director dealings 
 
If insiders are contrarians, it is expected that market returns will affect aggregate director 
dealings. In other words, an increase (decrease) in market price will lead insiders to sell (buy). 
We then relate insider sell (buy) to market conditions as measured by bull (bear) markets. 
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Since, in the bull market prices are up, higher insider sells are expected. In contrast, in bear 
market prices are down, hence higher insider purchases are expected. 
Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), this paper uses NPR which is the ratio of net 
purchases to total insider transactions, for measuring the aggregate director dealings activities. 
Each month starting from January 1999 to December 2007, the total numbers of insider 
purchases and sells and respective Pound Sterling volumes are calculated. We then calculate 
the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number (volume) of insider purchases by the total 
aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. Return on FTSE All Share Price Index is 
used as a proxy for market return. Figure 1 shows that there is a negative relationship between 
NPR and market returns, which supports the contrarian behavior.    
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The following regression model is estimated to examine the relationship between 
aggregate director dealings and the market return: 
135W ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴܲሺNሻW ൅ ߛܤܤ ൅ ߝ௧(1) 
Where, NPR is the aggregate director dealings activity in month t. BB is a binary 
variable equal to one for two periods: January 1999 - March 2000 and January 2004 - December 
2007. The bear market is from April 2000 - December 2003. ܴܲሺNሻWis the prior k-holding 
period return on market at time t. A negative relationship is expected between NPR and prior 
return (PR) as contrarian strategy implies a buy (sell) after a price decline (rise). Since NPR is 
positive (negative) if insiders are net buyer (seller), then we expect PR should be negatively 
related to NPR. We use 6-, 12-, 24- month returns prior to the event to examine whether the 
insiders buy (sell) as a reaction to market returns.  
Panel A shows the mean and median NPRs in the bull and bear markets. We calculate 
the NPR based on amount of shares traded and Pound Sterling value of trades. The mean NPR 
(value) for the bull and bear market is -0.59 and -0.23, respectively. This shows that the NPR 
11 
 
 
is more negative when the market is in bullish state compared to bearish state. The medians are 
very closer to means. NPR (amount) shows that in a bull market it is negative while in a bear 
market it is positive, suggesting that insiders are net sellers in bull markets and net buyers in 
bear markets. Figure 2 shows that in a bear market most of the NPRs are positive, suggesting 
that insiders are net buyers. In a bull market (shaded area) most of the NPRs are negative, 
meaning insiders are net sellers. 
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 here] 
Panels B and C of Table 1, report the regression results with and without accounting 
for market sentiment, based on NPR number of transactions and NPR money volume, 
respectively. Without accounting for sentiment, the results consistently show that PR over the 
k-period is statistically and economically significant. The negative sign of PR implies that 
insiders are contrarians and suggests that insiders sell after a price rise, and buy after a price 
decline, which supports our hypothesis (H1); our findings are consistent with Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) and Jiang and Zaman (2010) who show that insiders are contrarians. 
Although all the coefficients of PR are negative, the coefficient of PR becomes smaller 
as the holding period become longer. For example, the coefficient is -2.02 when a 6-month PR 
is used, compared to -0.55 when 24-month PR is used. This provides evidence that insiders 
rely more on recent price performance. The adjusted R2 also declines from 23.7% to 8%. 
Similar results are obtained using the NPR measure based on money volume. The predictive 
power of money volume-based NPR is higher than the number of transaction-based NPR. This 
may imply that when market moves are larger, insiders make large trades.  
When including market sentiment, in the first regression, we only use the BB dummy 
as an independent variable to examine the effect of the bull (bear) market on NPR. In the other 
regressions, we use 6-, 12-, 24-month PRs with the BB dummy. The results are consistent with 
the notion that insider buy trades increase in the bear market and insider sell trades are higher 
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in the bull market. Both the NPR measures are negatively related to the BB dummy, suggesting 
that insiders buy in the bear market with an expectation to sell in the bull market. Hence, 
insiders use the bull (bear) markets as a platform to act like contrarians. For instance, the BB 
dummy is -0.17 and statistically significant (t=-1.89).The evidence holds even after controlling 
for the contrarian behavior of the insiders by incorporating PRs; PR is -1.57 and statistically 
significant (t=-3.12). After controlling for contrarian strategies, we show that insiders further 
use the bull (bear) market to time the market, which supports hypothesis 2.  
4.2 Predictability of post-trade returns 
The previous section reports that insiders are contrarians. Here, we test whether the aggregate 
director dealings predict future market returns. If insider trades are informative, a positive 
relationship between aggregate director dealings measure (NPR) and future market return is 
expected. The following regression is estimated to examine the relationship between aggregate 
director dealings and return on market:  ? ሺ ? ൅ ெܴǡ௄ሻ െ  ? ሺ ? ൅ IܴN௧ା்௧ୀ௞௧ା்௧ୀ௞ ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴܰܲW ൅ ߛܴܲ ? ?W ൅ ߝ௧ (2) 
 
Where,ܴ0. is the market return in month k, ௙ܴǡ௞ is the monthly treasury bill rate in month k, 
135W is the NPR of aggregate director dealings activity in month t, ܴܲ ? ?W  is the prior two-
year holding period market return at time t4. We include the prior two-year holding period 
return in the regressions to control for the fact that insiders are contrarians, following 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001). We also control for the momentum factor documented in previous 
studies, as stocks that perform the best (worst) over a 3- to 12-month period tend to continue 
to perform well (poorly) over the subsequent 3 to 12 months (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). 
We control for the fact that the current market return is affected by the previous market returns, 
hence isolating insiders¶ information from the simple contrarian strategy/momentum effect.   
                                                 
4
 In unreported regressions, we use 6, 12 and 18 months PRs and the results are qualitatively similar. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 reports the regression results for 3, 6, 9 and 12-month holding periods. The 
coefficient NPR is negative and significant in most of the regressions. For example, Panel A, 
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of NPR is -0.05 (t=3.28) for the 3-month holding period, 
which shows that director dealings predict stock prices contrary to expectations. For the 
alternative holding periods, the results are qualitatively similar. For money volume, similar 
results are obtained for holding periods 3 and 9, while for holding periods 6 and 12 the 
coefficient is not significant. Overall, the results show that director dealings predict market 
return in the opposite direction to expectations. The negative coefficient of NPR is contrary to 
the findings of earlier studies undertaken on the US market (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) 
suggesting that the aggregate director dealings do not convey enough information to forecast 
future prices. Since the insider trades in the UK market are reported within 6 days, the 
information is short-lived.5 It might be possible that director dealings in the UK do not convey 
enough information to predict the aggregate market returns. Since insiders are net sellers (as 
NPR is negative for most of the time period) and individual sell trades do not convey 
information (as the returns are statistically and economically insignificant), the results of 
aggregate director dealings are partially consistent with that.    
5 Event Period Returns 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Information Content of Insider trades 
Table 3, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and t-tests for differences in means for 
company fundamentals. We measure size as the market value of equity five days before 
GLUHFWRUV¶trades, M/B as the market value to book value of equity ILYHGD\VEHIRUHGLUHFWRUV¶
trades, Stock volatility as standard deviation of stock measured from -240 to -41 days window 
                                                 
5
 For example, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) did not find any significant returns outside the (-20, +20) window. 
14 
 
 
relative to the trade, and market volatility as the standard deviation of market index over the 
same window. The results show strong differences between buy and sell trades. The average 
company sizes for buy and sell trades are statistically different. This is an early indication that 
the stocks insiders buy and sell are different, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g. 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The average M/B is also different for buy and sell trades. 
Furthermore, the mean difference t-test shows that they are statistically different.  
Table 33DQHO%UHSRUWVWKHUHVXOWVRQWKHPDUNHWUHDFWLRQWRLQVLGHUV¶WUDGHV.6 For the 
whole sample the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for buy trades over the pre-event 
periods [-40, -2] are negative and highly significant. In contrast, before the sell trades, the 
abnormal returns are positive and significant. The results clearly indicate the contrarian 
strategies adopted by insiders and the impact of the trades on the announcement dates, as well 
as the post-trade performance.   
The event day and post-event day returns for buy trades are positive and significant. In 
contrast, for the sell trades, the event day returns are negative, but not significant. Interestingly, 
the post-event day abnormal returns are neither negative nor significant for sell trades.  After 
the buy trades, share prices recover to a certain extent. However, after the sell trades, share 
prices do not decline, rather the trend stops and share prices level off.  These results support 
the earlier findings that the buy trades convey information, but the sell trades are not 
informative (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The t-test of differences in mean shows that the buy 
and sell trades are different.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
6
 This study uses the standard event study methodology based on the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985), 
with the parameters D and E computed over the estimation window [-240, -41] days relative to the event day to 
investigate the stock price reaction to dLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHV7KHHYHQWSHULRGLV>-40, +40]. We use the FTSE All Share 
Price Index, which covers 800 UK listed firms (about 50% of the companies listed in the main market and more 
than 97% market value of equity), as the market index because our sample includes small as well as large firms. 
We define event dates as the dates when the insider trades are announced. For robustness checks, we repeat all 
the analysis by using a market adjusted return model, and the results are qualitatively similar.  
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001) note that the abnormal returns around the reporting dates 
are not economically meaningful, though statistically significant. For example, they report 
abnormal returns of 0.13% and -0.23% for purchases and sells, respectively around reporting 
day. However, their findings are contrary to our results where we find abnormal returns of 
1.02% and -0.13% for buy and sell trades respectively. Pope et al. (1990) and Gregory et al. 
(1994) find puzzling results as market model CARs are negative for buys, and the returns are 
substantial. The results change dramatically when they adjust for size as the CARs become 
positive for buys and negative for sells in the post-event window. We find that the abnormal 
returns for the buy trades are statistically and economically significant when measured around 
the announcement date, which is consistent with Fidrmuc et al. (2006), and Pope et al.¶V (1990) 
and Gregory et al.¶V (1994) size adjusted returns. 
5.2 Market Sentiment and Price Impact of Insider Trades: Univariate Analysis 
This paper examines the price impact asymmetry and hence tests for market timing by splitting 
the sample period into bull (01/1999 - 03/2000 and 01/2004 - 12/2007) and bear (04/2000 - 
12/2003) periods. We find that the behavior of share prices following buy and sell trades does 
not depend on market conditions (Table 3, Panel B). The mean difference t-tests show that the 
behavior of CARs over different event windows is not significantly different. The only 
exception to this is that buy trades over the estimation window [-40, -2] in bull and bear markets 
show significant differences. Our results are in line with Korczak and Lasfer (2009), who find 
that the behavior of share prices following buy and sell trades does not depend on market 
conditions. These findings are in contrast to Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who assert that in a 
bull market, suppliers of liquidity are suspicious of buy orders, and run up the prices in the face 
of a strong buying interest.  
Chiyachantana et al. (2004) argue that suppliers of liquidity are not as cautious about 
the institutional sell orders in a bullish environment and do not run down prices as much when 
16 
 
 
they face selling interests. In bearish markets the situation is exactly the opposite. In a bullish 
market, buys have a bigger price impact, but in bearish markets sells have a bigger price impact. 
However, we find evidence which is almost contrary to this argument. The absolute magnitude 
of CARs for buy trades in bear periods is higher than the bull period trades [-5.53 vs. -3.14, 
1.12 vs. 0.92, 2.23 vs. 2.03 over the event window (-40, -2), (-1, +1), (+2, +40) respectively]. 
The only evidence which is consistent with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) is the absolute 
PDJQLWXGHRIWKHVHOOWUDGHV¶&$5LQWKHEHDUSHULRGZKLFKLVKLJKHUWKDQ sell trades [-0.26 vs. 
-0.001 over the event window (-1, +1)]. However, for both buy and sell trades, we do not find 
any significant difference in price response in bull and bear periods. Thus we accept hypothesis 
3. 
5.3 Market-to-book Quintiles: Univariate Analysis 
We form quintiles according to M/B ratios to test whether insiders buy undervalued shares, and 
sell over-valued shares and whether they time their trades.  A major difference between the 
current study and those of Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), is in 
forming those quintiles. Rozeff and Zaman (1998) rank their companies into deciles each year 
by annual book-to-price ratios. Similarly, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) divide their sample into 
three B/M groups based on the B/M ratio at the end of April of each calendar year. The annual 
measures are not likely to be good proxies for market mispricing and insiders¶ timing in the 
context of individual director dealings where the trades are announced daily. Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) examine whether the value (growth) strategy adopted by insiders can earn different 
returns in the long run. However, in this paper our objective is to examine whether there is any 
significant difference in the market reaction to director dealings in the short run in value and 
growth stocks. Hence, we compute the M/B ratios five days prior to the announcement date of 
directorV¶ trades to form M/B quintiles. The companies are sorted in quintiles each year by M/B 
ratios. Similar procedures are applied to form quintiles based on size.  
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The analysis of M/B quintiles shows evidence of signaling over- (under-) valuation 
(Table 4, Panels A and B). Low M/B companies (value stocks) are companies that are perceived 
to be undervalued. We expect insiders in these companies to signal undervaluation when they 
purchase shares, resulting in positive post-event abnormal returns.  As expected, for buy trades, 
as we move from low M/B to high M/B stocks, the post-event abnormal returns are becoming 
smaller. For example, the CAR for quintile 1 is 3.46 (t=5.72) and for quintile 5 is 0.79 (t=1.08) 
in the post-event window. The mean difference t-test indicates that quintile 1 is statistically 
different from quintile 5. Also, the chi-square test for differences among the means rejects 
equality of means. The results of the pre-event returns are also according to our expectations. 
As we move from low M/B to high M/B stocks, the pre-event abnormal returns are larger. The 
PHDQVRIµYDOXH¶ORZ0%DQGµJODPRXU¶KLJK0%VWRFNVDUHGLIIHUHQW0RUHRYHUWKHFKL-
square test shows differences among the means. When insiders buy in low M/B companies, the 
immediate price reaction of trades and price recovery is much higher, compared to high M/B 
companies (hypothesis 4). This is consistent with value strategies.   
In contrast, high M/B stocks are glamour stocks, which are likely to be over-valued. 
The post-VHOOWUDGHV¶DEQRUPDOUHWXUQVLQWKese companies should be negative. Table 4, Panel 
B shows that sell trades do not show strong evidence of signaling over-valuation. Only, the 
pre-HYHQWZLQGRZ&$5VVKRZVRPHHYLGHQFHRILQVLGHUV¶V\VWHPDWLFWUDGLQJEDVHGRQWKHLU
perceptions about the company. For example, the CARs are becoming higher as we move from 
value stocks to glamour stocks in the pre-event period, consistent with the literature. Even 
though there are pairwise differences in means between value and glamour stocks, the chi-
square test 2 (4)F does not indicate that there are significant differences among the quintiles. 
The event day and post-event day returns are not fully consistent with predictions. None of the 
CARs across the M/B quintiles are statistically significant. The mean difference t-test is not 
significant and the chi-square test shows there are no significant differences among the means. 
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Overall, insiders sell after a significant rise in prices and the trend stops following their sell 
trades. Hence, there is weak evidence of timing. Our results suggest that insiders are able to 
WLPHWKHLUWUDGHVEXWWKH\DUHQRWIXOO\FDSDEOHRIFKDQJLQJWKHPDUNHW¶VSHUFHSWLRQUHJDUGLQJ
WKHLU ILUP¶V WUXH YDOXH ,Q VXP WKH UHVXOWV SURYLGH SDUWLDO VXSSRUW IRU WKH SURSRVLWLRn that 
insiders follow growth strategies when they sell their shares.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5.4 Size Quintiles: Univariate Analysis 
Table 4, Panels C and D show the univariate results on size quintiles. The results show that 
there is evidence of market timing by the insiders for small stocks. If managers have timing 
abilities in small companies, we expect pre-event CARs to be higher as we move from small 
to large companies. Also, event and post-event abnormal returns will be lower as we move 
from small to large companies.  In the case of buy trades, even though the signs are as predicted, 
the pre-event returns do not increase as expected when moving through the quintiles. For 
instance, for smallest size quintile CAR is -2.25 (t=-2.69) compared to -2.93 (t=-4.87) for large 
size quintile stocks. The mean difference t-test between small and large companies is 
statistically insignificant, but the chi-square test for the differences in means for different 
quintiles is highly significant.   
In terms of event and post-event CARs the results are in line with our expectations.  For 
example, the event day CARs are gradually declining as we move from small to large 
companies (3.02, 1.22, 0.76, 0.15 and -0.12 respectively with the latter two not being 
statistically significant).  The post-event CARs also show similar patterns (2.95, 3.47, 2.36, 
0.94, 0.48 respectively, with all being significant except the last one). Furthermore, the mean 
difference t-test between small and large companies shows significance at the 1% level for 
event day and post-event abnormal returns. The evidence is substantiated by the chi-square test 
which shows that there is a significant difference across the means over the different quintiles 
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for both event day and post-event returns. Overall, the results support the proposition that 
insiders buy shares after a significant price decline; that after purchases the share price 
recovers; and that this behavior is more pronounced for small firms.  
The results for the sell trades do not provide strong evidence of market timing in the 
case of small companies (Table 4, Panel D). The pre-event window CARs show mixed 
HYLGHQFHRIPDQDJHUV¶V\VWHPDWLFWUDGing based on their perceptions about the company. For 
example, the CARs increase as we move from quintile 1 to quintile 3 and then decline again. 
Additionally, there are no significant differences in means between small and large stocks, and 
the differences across the quintiles are not statistically significant. The event day and post-
event day returns are not fully consistent with our predictions. None of the CARs across the 
size quintiles are statistically significant, except the post-event return for quintile 1. The mean 
difference t-test is not significant for event day returns and the chi-square test shows that there 
are no significant differences among the means. Overall, insiders sell after a significant rise in 
prices and the trend stops after they sell. This shows weak evidence of timing. Therefore, the 
results indicate that insiders are able to time their buy trades but not their sell trades in the case 
of small companies. This is consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) in the US and Gregory 
et al. (1994) in the UK, who find that insiders¶ timing ability is more pronounced in small firms.  
5.5 M/B and Size Sorting of Abnormal Returns 
This section provides two-way sorting based on M/B and size. The purpose of two-way sorting 
is to examine the effect of 0%DQGVL]HVLPXOWDQHRXVO\-HQWHUVKRZVWKDW LQVLGHUV¶
trades, in the US, hardly convey any information after controlling for M/B and size. We 
examine in this section whether the same applies in the UK. In the case of buy trades, most of 
the results in earlier analyses were driven by small companies and low M/B companies (Table 
5). For example, the event period returns show that all the returns across M/B quintiles are 
significant only for the small company quintile. None of the event period returns are significant 
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for the large company quintile. In addition, the post-event returns are significant in the small 
company quintile and all the post-event returns are insignificant in the large company quintile. 
This implies, after controlling for M/B and size, that insider purchases do not convey any 
information (hypothesis 5). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
For example, the event day return for the largest company quintile and largest M/B 
quintile is actually negative (-0.58, t=- 0.98). The post-event return for the largest company 
and high M/B quintile is also negative (-0.31, t=-0.23). These results are consistent with earlier 
findings in the US that most of the insider returns are not indistinguishable from zero, once the 
size and M/B effects are controlled for.  However, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that the 
abnormal returns around the reporting dates do not depend on size or M/B. We find that the 
reporting period abnormal returns are directly related to M/B and size. Our results are 
consistent with the view that smaller companies are associated with more information 
asymmetry and hence the market reaction is higher. Smaller companies are also more risky, 
which may yield higher returns when insiders trade.   
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results on sell trades (Table 6) VKRZWKDWSULRUWRGLUHFWRUV¶VHOOWUDGHV there is a 
significant price run up for most of the size and M/B quintiles and suggest that glamour stocks 
have higher pre-trade returns than value stocks. For example, for the 3rd size quintile and the 
1st M/B quintile (low M/B) the pre-trade short-term average return is 3.82% (t=2.02) while, for 
the same size quintile and high M/B, the average pre-trade return is 8.03% (t=3.43). The results 
on the event period returns show there is no significant market reaction, suggesting that 
directors¶ sell trades do not convey any information in the short run. In addition, the post-trade 
returns are mostly insignificant. Overall, the pre-, event, and post-event returns show that 
directors time their sell trades by selling at a higher price, though their trades do not convey 
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any information to the market. Our results are consistent with earlier findings RIGLUHFWRUV¶VHOO
trades being motivated by other considerations, such as portfolio rebalancing and 
diversification, rather than being information driven (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).   
5.6 Stock and Market Volatility sorting 
In this section, we sort the CARs from low to high stock volatility.7  The results (Table 7, Panel 
A) show that for buy trades, low volatility stocks display lower price drops in the pre-event 
window and the market reaction is smaller immediately and in the post-event period compared 
to the high volatility stocks. The mean difference between low and high volatility is highly 
significant. In addition, we find that the means are different across all the quintiles for the pre-
event and event windows. However, for sell trades, the CAR is lower for low volatility stocks 
during the pre-event window compared to high volatility stocks. (Table 7, Panel B). 
Furthermore, the means between high and low volatility stocks are significantly different and 
the chi-square test shows that the means across quintiles are not homogeneous. The results 
imply that insiders have more knowledge on high volatile stocks (hypothesis 6). 
When we sort the stocks based on market volatility, the results are similar (Table 7, 
Panel C and D). For buy trades, the higher the market volatility prior to the trades, the higher 
the market reaction. This holds for both the event and the post-event windows.  The post-event 
market reaction for low volatility (0.97%) is significantly lower compared with high volatility 
(3.46%). Regarding the sell trades, they are preceded by high market volatility and the market 
reaction in the post-event period is positive and significant (1.89% with t=2.93). The mean 
difference between low and high is highly significant, and chi-square rejects the null of 
                                                 
7
 We document that returns are larger when market and stock volatility are larger, though this could be driven by 
the use of CARs which can be biased for anything other than short-term windows. Therefore, one might argue 
that a positive relationship between CARs and returns is unsurprising, given the well-known problems of positive 
bias in CARs (Kothari and Warner, 1997). We repeat the analysis using BHARs (unreported) and the results 
remain qualitatively similar. Hence, we conclude that insiders are more knowledgeable in volatile stocks.      
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homogeneity. In sum, we find that high (low) stoFNVDQGPDUNHWYRODWLOLW\SULRUWRWKHLQVLGHUV¶
trades are related to high (low) market reaction.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.7 Cross Sectional Variation in Abnormal Returns 
This section runs cross-sectional regressions to control for a number of factors simultaneously. 
The overall results of univariate analysis show that insiders buy (sell) undervalued (over-
valued) stocks as measured by M/B and find evidence of market timing in the purchase of small 
company stocks. In particular, as we move from low to high quintiles for M/B, size, stock 
volatility and market volatility for the pre-event, event and post-event, abnormal returns vary. 
Clearly, these provide evidence that the abnormal returns vary with M/B, size, stock volatility 
and market volatility.   
Therefore, we estimate the following model separately for the buy and sell trades: 
1 2 3 4( ) /j j j j jCAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum
Year Industry
D E E E E N
J T
     
   
where, Ln (size) is the log of firm size measured as the market value of equity five days before 
the trade, M/B is the market-to-book ratio, where the market value of equity is taken five days 
before the trade and the book value is the book value of equity at the balance sheet date, Stock 
Vol is the standard deviation of stock returns over -240 to -41 days UHODWLYHWRWKHGLUHFWRUV¶
trades, Mkt Vol  is the standard deviation of market returns over -240 to -41 days relative to the 
GLUHFWRUV¶trades, and BB Dum  is a dummy equal to 1 for the Bull Market and 0 otherwise.  
In order to isolate the pure cross-sectional component of the M/B and size effect on 
director dealings, a set of regressions are estimated using the entire sample period from 1999 
to 2007. The results are reported in Table 8. The M/B effects are negative and significant in 
the case of buy trades, suggesting that managers buy undervalued stocks. These findings are 
consistent with the M/B quintile analysis. Therefore, the director dealings decisions are 
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influenced by the relative market valuations. We also exDPLQHWKHLPSDFWRIVL]HRQLQVLGHUV¶
market timing ability.  The coefficient is negative and significant for the buy trades, which is 
consistent with the evidence that insiders try to time the market in the case of small companies. 
For buy trades, both the stock and market volatility are positive and significant in most cases, 
suggesting that risky stocks earn higher returns, and high market volatility is related to higher 
returns. This is consistent with Huddart and Ke (2006), who assert that for companies where 
information asymmetry is higher, the abnormal returns are higher. In sum, the results suggest 
that insiders time their buy trades. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
For sell trades, M/B has a positive but not significant relationship (Table 8). The sign 
is consistent with our predictions, suggesting that insiders sell over-valued stocks. Furthermore, 
size has a negative relationship and market volatility has a positive relationship but only for 
the post-event market reaction CAR (+2, +40). Overall, the results suggest that M/B, size and 
PDUNHWYRODWLOLW\VLJQLILFDQWO\DIIHFWWKHPDUNHW¶VUHDFWLRQWRGLUHFWRUGHDOLQJV 
Finally, the documented pattern of insider purchases and sells across M/B, size and 
stock volatility quintiles could also be due to some omitted variable measuring and unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms in different quintiles. One crude measure of heterogeneity across 
firms is the industry in which they operate. It is well established that the M/B ratios in the same 
industry tend to move together and that several industries are characterized by extreme 
valuations. Some particular businesses are considerably more investment intensive and the 
company size of that industry can be larger than in other industries. Therefore, in order to 
determine whether the M/B and size effect on director dealings is simply an industry effect, we 
incorporate industry dummies in the regressions. Finally, for assessing whether the results are 
time dependent or not, we also include year dummies in our regressions. In none of the cases 
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are the industry dummies or year dummies significant, suggesting that our results are not driven 
by industry or time effects.  
6 &RQFOXVLRQ 
This study employs a unique data set to test whether insiders time their trades or not. This is 
one of the first studies to examine aggregate in director dealings in the context of UK. We find 
that on an aggregate basis, insiders are contrarians but aggregate director dealings do not 
predict monthly returns. This is consistent with the view that the information content of director 
dealings is limited to the period surrounding the announcement dates. We then examine 
whether director dealings are related to the market sentiment, as measured by a bull (bear) 
PDUNHW7KHDJJUHJDWHGLUHFWRUGHDOLQJVDFWLYLW\VKRZVDUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQLQVLGHUV¶PDUNHW
timing and market sentiment, as measured by bull (bear) periods. This provides evidence that 
insiders use market sentiment to act like contrarians. However, we do not find a significant 
difference in the price response during bull and bear periods. 
Further, this study examines whether there are any relationships between company 
fundamentals and the timing of insider trades, as addressed in Rozeff and Zaman (1998), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Jenter (2005) and Gregory et al. (2013). Insiders tend to buy stocks 
with poor past performance, and those that are cheap according to proxies such as the M/B 
ratio. Consistent ZLWK WKH H[LVWLQJ OLWHUDWXUH WKH LQVLGHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR WLPH WKHLU WUDGHV LV QRW
homogeneous across all market capitalization groups. Insiders have a relative advantage in 
timing in the case of small stocks compared to large stocks. We show that the information 
asymmetry has an important impact on the market reactions to insider trades, as in Kyle (1985). 
The results question the notion that insiders are able to earn excess returns with their 
trades when controlling for size and M/B effects. Recent insider trading literature confirms the 
finding that most excess returns to insider trades can be explained by the size and M/B effects, 
and suggests that the economically significant excess returns in older studies are due to the lack 
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of control for these observable firm characteristics (Jenter, 2005).  In line with the US findings 
of Lakonishok and Lee (2001), we show that in the UK excess returns are not significant in the 
short run after controlling for M/B and size. Finally, we show that insiders show timing ability 
in highly volatile stocks, and following high volatility in the market.  
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Table 1. Aggregate Insider Trading and Market Return 
Panel A: Mean Differences in NPR between Bull and Bear markets 
 Mean Median  
 Bull Bear Bull Bear P (bull-bear) 
NPR (amount) -0.25 0.12 -0.28 0.11 0.00 
NPR (value) -0.59 -0.23 -0.62 -0.28 0.00 
      
Regression Results 
Prior Returns 
(Months) 
Constant PR BB ܀ഥ૛  
Panel B: Number of  Transactions 
 0.12 (1.18) -- -0.37 (-3.27) *** 16.1  
6 -0.04 (-1.03) -2.02
 (-4.44) ***  23.7  
0.04 (0.63) -1.57 (-3.12) *** -0.17 (-1.89) * 25.3  
12 -0.04 (-0.73) -1.32
 (-3.36) ***  18.2  
0.03 (0.43) -0.89 (-1.80) * -0.16 (-1.17) 18.7  
24 -0.04 (-0.92) -0.55
 (-3.06) ***  8.0  
0.12 (1.18) 0.00 (0.00) -0.37 (-2.45) *** 15.3  
Panel C:  Money Volume  
 -0.22 (-2.09) ** -- -0.37(-3.24) *** 18.1  
6 -0.39
 (-10.14) 
***
 
-2.08 (-4.71) ***  29.6  
-0.32 (-4.54) *** -1.70 (-3.20) *** -0.15 (-1.65) * 31.0  
12 -0.39
 (-7.26) *** -1.26 (-3.48) ***  19.5  
-0.30 (-3.84)*** -0.79 (-1.99) * -0.18 (-1.51) 20.6  
24 -0.37
 (-5.72) ***  -0.76 (-3.03) ***  18.8  
-0.28 (-3.85) -0.46 (-2.04) ** -0.20 (-1.90) * 20.9  
Panel A of this table represents mean (median) of NPR for each month from January 1999 through 
December 2007. 
Panel B reports the results from the following regression: 
 ܴܰܲ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴܲሺ݇ሻ௧ ൅ ߛܤܤ ୲୧  is the NPR of aggregate director dealings activity in month t. ܲ ܴሺ݇ሻ௧  is the prior two-year holding 
period return on market at time t. BB is a binary variable equal to 1 for the Bull market and 0 otherwise, 
where the Bull Market includes two periods: January 1999 through March 2000 and January 2004 
through December 2007. Bear market is from April 2000 through December 2003. Each month starting 
from January 1999 through December 2007, we calculate the total numbers of (and the total Pound 
Sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. We then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate 
number (volume) of insider purchases by the total aggregate number (volume) of insider transactions. 
We use 6, 12 and 24-month PRs. The Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-
statistics are in parenthesis. ***,**,* represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 2. Predictive Ability of Post-trade Returns 
Holding Period(months) Constant NPR PR24 തܴଶ
 
Panel A Number of  transactions    
3 -0.01(-1.11) -0.05 (-3.28) *** 0.03(0.79) 12.3 
6 -0.02(-1.22) -0.07(-2.90) *** 0.04(0.59) 13.9 
9 -0.03(-1.31) -0.11(-3.48)*** 0.02(0.22) 15.8 
12 -0.05(-1.40) -0.14(-3.33) *** -0.01(-0.12) 14.4 
     
Panel B Money Volume     
3 -0.02(-2.49) -0.04(-1.86)* 0.03(0.64) 8.0 
6 -0.04(-2.06) ** -0.05(-1.57) 0.05(0.56) 7.6 
9 -0.06(-1.87) * -0.07(-1.69) * 0.04(0.30) 5.9 
12 -0.07(-1.56) -0.07(-1.25) 0.02(0.14) 2.0 
This table reports the regression results from the following model. ෑሺ ? ൅ ெܴǡ௄ሻ െ ෑሺ ? ൅ ௙ܴǡ௞௧ା்௧ୀ௞௧ା்௧ୀ௞ ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܴܰܲWȖܴܲ ? ?W 
Where, 5ெǡ௄ is the return on market in month k, ௙ܴǡ௞ is the monthly Treasury bill rate in month k, ܴܰܲ௧ is the NPR of aggregate director dealings activity in month t, ܴܲ ? ?௧ is the prior two-year 
holding period return at time t. Each month starting from January 1999 through December 2007, we 
calculate the total numbers of (and the total Pound Sterling volume) of insider purchases and sells. We 
then calculate the NPR by dividing the net aggregate number of insider purchases by the total aggregate 
number of insider transactions. We predict market returns for 3, 6, 9 and 12-month horizons. The 
Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***,**,* 
represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Market Reaction of Insider Trades 
Panel A: Fundamentals 
 Buy trades Sell trades (p Buy-sell) 
 Mean Median Mean Median  
Size (Market Cap) 5,073.86 403.1 6,817.81 403.34 0.02 
M/B 2.28 1.46 3.94 2.34 0.00 
Stock Volatility 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.019  
Market Volatility 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011  
Number of 
Observations 
26,268  7,723   
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Different Market Conditions 
 Full sample Bear 
Period 
Bull 
Period 
 P Bear-Bull 
Buy trades      
N 26,268 10,274 15,994   
CAR(-40,-2) -4.32*** 
(-15.37) 
-5.53*** 
(-13.87) 
-3.14*** 
(-7.39) 
 0.00 
CAR(-1,+1) 1.02*** 
(13.11) 
1.12*** 
(10.14) 
0.92*** 
(7.83) 
 0.41 
CAR(+2,+40) 2.13*** 
(7.59) 
2.23*** 
(5.60) 
2.03*** 
(4.77) 
 0.71 
Sell trades      
N 7,723 2,312 5,411   
CAR(-40,-2) 5.60*** 
(10.05) 
5.06*** 
(7.12) 
6.11*** 
(8.17) 
 0.27 
CAR(-1,+1) -0.13 
(-0.83) 
-0.26 
(-1.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
 0.39 
CAR(+2,+40) 0.24 
(0.44) 
0.76 
(1.08) 
-0.26 
(-0.35) 
 0.20 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of the companies in our sample and event study results. 
Panel A represents company fundamentals. Size is the market value of equity ILYHGD\VEHIRUHGLUHFWRUV¶
trades, M/B is the market value to book value of equity ILYH GD\V EHIRUH GLUHFWRUV¶ trades, Stock 
volatility is the standard deviation of stock measured from -240 to -41 days¶ window, and market 
volatility is the standard deviation from the market from the same window. Panel B presents cumulative 
DYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DURXQG GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ HYHQWV FRPSXWHG XVLQJ HYHQW VWXG\
methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -240 to -41 relative to the 
event, with the FTSE All Share Price Index as the proxy for market portfolio. All results are reported 
UHODWLYH WR GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ DQQRXQFHPHQW GD\ LH WKH GDWH RI WKH SXEOLF DQQRXQFHPHQW RI
GLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ7KHEXOOSHULRGFRYHUVIURP-DQXDU\ through March 2000 and January 
2004 through December 2007 and the bear period covers April 2000 through December 2003. T-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Market-to-Book and Size 
 Market-to-Book Quintiles 
 
 Low 2 3 4 High P
 High-
Low 
2 (4)F  
 Panel A: Buy 
-40,-2 -7.18*** 
(-11.87) 
-6.82*** 
(-12.02) 
-4.58*** 
(-7.06) 
-1.76*** 
(-3.03) 
-1.11 
(-1.59) 
0.00 82.06*** 
-1,+1 1.41*** 
(8.43) 
0.97*** 
(6.16) 
0.83*** 
(4.61) 
0.78*** 
(4.86) 
1.01*** 
(5.33) 
0.38 7.17 
+2,+40 3.46*** 
(5.72) 
3.08*** 
(5.42) 
1.33** 
(2.06) 
1.95*** 
(3.34) 
0.79 
(1.08) 
0.00 12.43** 
 Panel B: Sell 
-40,-2 3.30*** 
(2.57) 
4.70*** 
(4.10) 
5.64*** 
(5.40) 
6.88*** 
(6.83) 
7.33*** 
(6.35) 
0.01 7.72 
-1,+1 -0.07 
(-0.19) 
0.14 
(0.46) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.37 
(-1.36) 
-0.44 
(-1.39) 
0.37 2.83 
+2,+40 0.03 
(0.02) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.99 
(0.95) 
-0.60 
(-0.61) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
0.89 1.18 
 Size Quintiles 
 
 Panel C: Buy 
 Small 2 3 4 Large P
 small-
large 
2 (4)F  
-40,-2 -2.25*** 
(-2.69) 
-4.89*** 
(-7.53) 
-7.79*** 
(-12.42) 
-3.76*** 
(-6.75) 
-2.93*** 
(-4.87) 
0.53 43.79*** 
-1,+1 3.02*** 
(13.03) 
1.22*** 
(6.77) 
0.76*** 
(4.37) 
0.15 
(1.03) 
-0.12 
(-0.70) 
0.00 156.47*** 
+2,+40 2.95*** 
(3.52) 
3.47*** 
(5.34) 
2.36*** 
(3.76) 
0.94* 
(1.68) 
0.48 
(0.81) 
0.00 57.33*** 
        
 Panel D: Sell 
-40,-2 4.62*** 
(3.40) 
5.65*** 
(6.14) 
6.67*** 
(6.25) 
5.58*** 
(4.54) 
5.45*** 
(5.76) 
0.58 1.55 
-1,+1 0.20 
(0.53) 
-0.44 
(-1.73) 
-0.28 
(-0.95) 
0.28 
(0.82) 
-0.40 
(1.54) 
0.27 5.02 
+2,+40 3.00** 
(2.21) 
-0.83 
(-0.89) 
-0.08 
(-0.08) 
-0.46 
(-0.38) 
-0.42 
(-0.45) 
0.00 6.39 
7KH WDEOH UHSUHVHQWV FXPXODWLYH DYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQV DURXQG GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ E\ XVLQJ WKH HYHQW VWXG\
methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -240 to -41 relative to the event date, with FTSE 
All Share Price Index as the proxy for the PDUNHWSRUWIROLR7KHIXOOVDPSOHLQFOXGHVGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHVLQ2,664 listed 
FRPSDQLHV VSOLW LQWR  SXUFKDVHV DQG  VHOOV $OO UHVXOWV DUH UHSRUWHG UHODWLYH WR GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ
DQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWHRIWKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJ7KHPDUNHW-to-book quintiles were 
formed five days before the announcement dates. If we define t as the event date, then we use t-GD\V¶0%UDWLRWRIRUP
quintiles based on the M/B ratio. In forming the quintiles we first sort the CARs by year according to the market-to-book ratio. 
Each year we then sort the CARs in quintiles by the market-to-book ratio. Finally, we sort them based on quintiles. In doing 
so, the year effect has been removed from the M/B quintiles. The same steps are followed to form the size quintiles. P high-low  
reports the p value of mean difference test between CARs from highest M/B vs. lowest market-to-book quintiles. P small-large 
reports the p value of mean difference test between CARs for small vs. large companies. The last column reports the chi-square 
test for differences in means across market-to-book and size quintiles. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Buy Trades by Size & M/B 
 Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B 
  Pre-trade Returns (-40,-2) 
Small 
 
-4.65*** 
(-3.62) 
-4.83*** 
(-3.52) 
-3.62** 
(-2.34) 
-3.40** 
(-2.04) 
-0.32 
(-0.15) 
2 
 
-12.82*** 
(-5.56) 
-13.32*** 
(-6.30) 
-6.44*** 
(-3.63) 
-5.02** 
(-2.13) 
0.29 
(0.14) 
3 
 
-7.62*** 
(-4.08) 
-4.82*** 
(-2.73) 
-6.87*** 
(-3.19) 
-7.18*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.73 
(-0.36) 
4 
 
-9.09*** 
(-4.57) 
-5.75*** 
(-2.55) 
-1.95 
(-0.86) 
-2.26 
(-0.96) 
-2.17 
(-1.32) 
Big 
 
-1.68 
(-0.25) 
-14.91*** 
(-3.54) 
-3.64 
(-1.53) 
-1.05 
(-0.62) 
-2.06 
(-1.09) 
 Event day Returns (-1,+1) 
Small 
 
1.92*** 
(4.80) 
2.35*** 
(5.48) 
2.35*** 
(4.87) 
1.90*** 
(4.87) 
4.13*** 
(6.04) 
2 
 
1.38** 
(1.91) 
0.88 
(1.33) 
0.65 
(1.18) 
1.20* 
(1.64) 
2.54*** 
(3.80) 
3 
 
1.10* 
(1.87) 
0.52 
(0.94) 
-0.49 
(-0.73) 
0.20 
(0.32) 
0.45 
(0.72) 
4 
 
0.43 
(0.69) 
-1.68** 
(-2.38) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.44 
(0.59) 
0.22 
(0.43) 
Big 
 
3.16 
(1.53) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.31 
(-0.41) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.58 
(-0.98) 
 Post-trade Returns (+2,+40) 
Small 
 
4.66*** 
(5.11) 
2.49** 
(2.55) 
1.98* 
(1.80) 
2.07* 
(1.74) 
3.12** 
(2.01) 
2 
 
5.23*** 
(3.19) 
7.07*** 
(4.70) 
0.67 
(0.53) 
1.80 
(1.07) 
1.64 
(1.08) 
3 
 
3.58*** 
(2.69) 
1.49 
(1.18) 
2.05 
(1.34) 
3.45 
(2.49) 
-1.73 
(-1.22) 
4 
 
-0.66 
(-0.47) 
1.57 
(0.98) 
1.07 
(0.66) 
1.60 
(0.96) 
1.56 
(1.33) 
Big 
 
1.34 
(0.29) 
7.13** 
(2.38) 
0.43 
(0.25) 
0.96 
(0.79) 
-0.31 
(-0.23) 
7KHDERYHWDEOHUHSUHVHQWVFXPXODWLYHDYHUDJHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVDURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJE\XVLQJHYHQW
study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 to -41 relative to the 
event, with FTSE All Share Price Index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample includes 26,268 
SXUFKDVHV$OOUHVXOWVDUHUHSRUWHGUHODWLYHWRGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWHRIWKHSXEOLF
DQQRXQFHPHQW RI GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ 7KH 0% DQG VL]H TXLQtiles were formed five days before the 
announcement dates. If we define t as the event date, then we use t-GD\V¶0%DQGVL]HWRIRUPTXLQWLOHVEDVHG
on M/B and size. In forming the quintiles, the CARs were first sorted by year according to M/B and size. For each 
year the CARs were then sorted into quintiles first by M/B and then by size. In doing so, the year effect has been 
removed from the quintiles. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Sell Trades by M/B and Size 
 Low M/B 2 3 4 High M/B 
 Pre-trade Returns (-40,-2) 
Small 
 
3.83** 
(2.51) 
2.91 
(1.05) 
4.01 
(1.60) 
2.59 
(1.00) 
0.11 
(0.02) 
2 
 
7.67*** 
(4.94) 
1.21 
(0.56) 
10.60** 
(2.40) 
1.39 
(0.47) 
0.48 
(0.14) 
3 
 
3.82** 
(2.02) 
3.84 
(1.55) 
10.40*** 
(3.10) 
5.32** 
(2.18) 
8.03** 
(3.43) 
4 
 
10.66*** 
(3.99) 
7.44*** 
(3.49) 
3.85 
(1.20) 
7.56*** 
(3.90) 
3.20 
(1.22) 
Big 
 
4.23 
(1.42) 
9.52*** 
(3.95) 
7.97*** 
(4.52) 
7.22*** 
(3.38) 
4.17 
(1.06) 
 Event day Returns (-1,+1) 
Small 
 
-0.45 
(-0.94) 
0.50 
(0.57) 
-0.08 
(-0.10) 
0.80 
(0.98) 
-1.32 
(0.90) 
2 
 
0.27 
(0.56) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-1.90 
(-1.37) 
0.51 
(0.55) 
0.31 
(0.29) 
3 
 
0.79 
(1.33) 
-0.75 
(-0.97) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.63 
(0.83) 
-0.67 
(-0.91) 
4 
 
-1.03 
(-1.23) 
-0.61 
(-0.92) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.37 
(-0.44) 
Big 
 
0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.33 
(-0.44) 
-0.43 
(-0.77) 
-0.80 
(-1.19) 
-0.66 
(-0.54) 
 Post-trade Returns (+2,+40) 
Small 
 
1.80 
(1.39) 
-0.30 
(-0.13) 
-0.83 
(-0.39) 
-4.77** 
(-2.16) 
4.25 
(0.90) 
2 
 
1.90 
(1.44) 
1.28 
(0.69) 
-1.51 
(-0.40) 
-2.43 
(-0.96) 
-2.19 
(-0.77) 
3 
 
-1.02 
(-0.63) 
2.04 
(0.97) 
-0.28 
(-0.10) 
3.54* 
(1.70) 
1.41 
(0.71) 
4 
 
-1.76 
(-0.77) 
-1.04 
(-0.57) 
2.40 
(0.88) 
-0.43 
(-0.26) 
-1.20 
(-0.54) 
Big 
 
5.19** 
(2.04) 
-1.07 
(-0.52) 
-2.31 
(-1.54) 
1.43 
(0.78) 
3.58 
(1.08) 
7KHDERYHWDEOHUHSUHVHQWVFXPXODWLYHDYHUDJHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQVDURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHSXUFKDVHVE\XVLQJHYHQW
study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 to -41 relative to the 
event, with FTSE All Share Price Index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample includes 7,723 sells. 
$OO UHVXOWV DUH UHSRUWHG UHODWLYH WR GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ DQQRXQFHPHQW GD\ LH WKH GDWH RI WKH SXEOLF
DQQRXQFHPHQW RI GLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJ 7KH 0% DQG VL]H TXLntiles were formed five days before the 
announcement dates. If we define t as the event date, then we use t-GD\V¶0%DQGVL]HWRIRUPTXLQWLOHVEDVHG
on M/B and size. In forming the quintiles, the CARs were sorted first by year according to M/B and size. For each 
year the CARs were then sorted into quintiles first by M/B and then by size. In doing so, the year effect has been 
removed from the quintiles. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Distribution of CARs by Stock and Market Volatility 
 Stock volatility Quintiles   
 Low 2 3 4 High P
 High-Low 2 (4)F  
 Panel A: Buy 
-40,-2 -1.32*** -3.53*** -5.06*** -3.50*** -8.20*** 0.000 30.15*** 
 (-5.11) (-13.10) (-16.41) (-11.07) (-12.80)   
-1,+1 0.75*** 0.66*** 0.85*** 0.45*** 2.35*** 0.000 15.65** 
 (10.87) (7.09) (8.73) (3.83) (12.36)   
+2,+40 2.16*** 1.63*** 1.01*** 2.23*** 3.19*** 0.000 5.3 
 (10.55) (6.88) (3.78) (8.56) (8.15)   
 Panel B: Sell 
-40,-2 5.66*** 4.66*** 3.77*** 4.26*** 9.59*** 0.024 12.95* 
 (6.12) (5.30) (4.38) (4.22) (6.52)   
-1,+1 0.14 -0.45* -0.22 -0.49 0.36 0.692 3.44 
 (0.81) (-1.78) (-0.76) (-1.55) (0.69)   
+2,+40 0.14 -0.20 1.09 -0.95 1.15 0.450 3.36 
 (0.18) (-0.29) (1.29) (-0.89) (1.04)   
Market  volatility Quintiles 
Panel C: Buy 
-40,-2 -7.49*** -4.93*** -2.69*** -1.16*** -5.36*** 0.092 42.90*** 
 (-20.71) (-11.08) (-7.27) (-3.95) (-12.18)   
-1,+1 0.76*** 0.79*** 1.06*** 1.02*** 1.43*** 0.081 3.63 
 (7.16) (6.54) (8.89) (8.52) (10.38)   
+2,+40 0.97*** 1.44*** 0.45* 3.86*** 3.46*** 0.000 29.80*** 
 (3.23) (4.17) (1.78) (17.16) (13.79)   
Panel D: Sell 
-40,-2 7.46*** 6.29*** 5.86*** 5.07*** 3.30*** 0.018 8.78* 
 (4.94) (6.88) (5.75) (6.05) (3.77)   
-1,+1 -0.59 0.24 -0.17 0.15 -0.27 0.496 3.44 
 (-1.61) (0.66) (-0.63) (0.42) (-0.91)   
+2,+40 -1.62 -1.66 0.41 2.21*** 1.89*** 0.007 16.42** 
 (-1.45) (-1.51) (0.52) (3.02) (2.93)   
7KHDERYH WDEOH UHSUHVHQWV FXPXODWLYH DYHUDJH DEQRUPDO UHWXUQVDURXQGGLUHFWRUV¶ VKDUH WUDGLQJE\
using event study methodology. The market model coefficients D and E are estimated over days -220 
to -41 relative to the event, with FTSE All Share Price Index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The 
IXOOVDPSOHLQFOXGHVGLUHFWRUV¶WUDGHVLQOLVWHGFRPSDQLHVVSOLWLQWRSXUFKDVHVDQG
VHOOV$OOUHVXOWVDUHUHSRUWHGUHODWLYHWRGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUHWUDGLQJDQQRXQFHPHQWGD\LHWKHGDWe 
RI WKHSXEOLFDQQRXQFHPHQWRIGLUHFWRUV¶VKDUH WUDGLQJStock Volatility is the standard deviation of 
stock returns over -240 to -41 days and Market Volatility is the standard deviation of market returns 
over -240 to -41 days.  In forming stock volatility quintiles, CARs are sorted by stock volatility. In 
forming market volatility quintiles, CARs are sorted by market volatility. P low-high reports the p value of 
the mean difference test between CARs from the highest volatility vs. lowest volatility quintiles. The 
last column reports the chi-square test for differences in means across size quintiles. T-statistics are 
reported under the CARs. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. OLS Results on CARs 
 Panel A: Buy Trades   Panel B: Sell Trades   
 CAR-1,+1  CAR+2,+40  CAR-1,+1  CAR+2,+40  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.003 
(0.79) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.085*** 
(-2.39) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.052* 
(-1.76) 
-0.048* 
(-1.89) 
Size -0.003*** 
(-5.27) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.004** 
(-2.23) 
-0.004** 
(-2.23) 
-0.005 
(-0.84) 
-0.006 
(-0.74) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.004** 
(-2.25) 
Market-to-book -0.001* 
(-1.94) 
-0.003* 
(-2.36) 
-0.007 
(-1.61) 
-0.007* 
-(1.80) 
-0.001 
(-0.57) 
-0.003 
(-0.64) 
0.002* 
(1.74) 
0.001* 
(1.65) 
Stock Volatility 0.518*** 
(4.80) 
0.510*** 
(3.13) 
0.840*** 
(2.52) 
0.789*** 
(2.36) 
0.075 
(0.25) 
0.073 
(0.31) 
0.553 
(0.54) 
0.353 
(0.46) 
Market Volatility 0.353 
(0.60) 
0.838 
(1.06) 
0.29*** 
(3.17) 
0.523*** 
(5.42) 
0.414 
(0.45) 
0.264 
(0.41) 
0.852*** 
(4.54) 
0.912*** 
(4.52) 
BB Dummy 0.001 
(0.44) 
-- 0.008 
(1.25) 
-- 0.003 
(0.57) 
-- 0.002 
(0.52) 
-- 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy -- Yes -- Yes -- Yes -- Yes 
Adj. R2 0.053 0.053 0.042 0.033 0.035 0.020 0.022 0.022 
F (Probability) 5.72 (0.00) 5.40(0.00) 3.53(0.00) 3.73(0.00) 0.46 (0.81) 0.38(0.85) 5.06 (0.00) 4.59 (0.00) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The above table reports the regression results using the following model. 
 
1 2 3 4( ) /j j j j jCAR Ln Size M B StockVol MktVol BBDum Year IndustryD E E E E N J T         
where, 
,j tCAR  is the CAR of insider trades for the (-1,+1) and (+2,+40) event windows. Model 1 is the model with a bull (bear) dummy and industry dummy 
and model 2 is the model with a year dummy and industry dummy. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, Market-to-book is the ratio of 
market-to-book value of equity. Stock Volatility is the volatility of a stock measured by the standard deviation over 180 days prior to the event.  Mkt Volatility 
is the volatility of the market measured by the standard deviation over 180 days prior to the event. The BB dummy is 1 if the trade is from the bull period 
(January 1999 - March 2000 and January 2004 - December 2007) and 0 otherwise. White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
The last row reports F-statistics with p-values in parenthesis next to them. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Monthly NPR and Market Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure represents a time series of net purchase ratio (NPR Value) and 6-month prior return (PR6) 
for each month from January 1999 through December 2007. For each month, we calculate the total 
Pound Sterling volume (and the total numbers of) insider purchases and sells. We then calculate the 
NPR by dividing the net aggregate value of insider purchases by the total aggregate value of insider 
transactions. Prior Returns (PR6) represents the FTSE All Share Price Index returns over the 6 months 
before the trade. 
 
Figure 2. Aggregate Insider Trading and Bull (Bear) Market 
 
 
This figure represents a time series of NPR for each month from January 1999 through December 2007. 
The shaded region is the bull market and contains two periods (January 1999 through March 2000 and 
January 2004 through December 2007). For each month, we calculate the total numbers of (and the total 
Pound Sterling volume) insider purchases and sells. We then calculate the NPR by dividing the net 
aggregate number of insider purchases by the total aggregate number of insider transactions.  
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